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    The most vociferous opposition to globalization in Western countries has come from 
the extreme left: anti-globalization riots from Seattle to Genoa have been based on the 
view that mobile global capitalism is making the rich richer and the poor poorer.' We 
have not yet had much violent opposition to globalization from right-wing cultural na-
tionalists-except perhaps in France, where McDonalds restaurants have been attacked 
as symbols of American culinary imperialism. The French, of course, take culture very 
seriously-especially culinary culture. But the general view in the West seems to be that 
globalization is simply another product of the progress of Western civilization, following 
inevitably in the wake of industrialization, capitalism, modernity, postmodernity, and the 
unstoppable advance of science and technology.' Indeed, I suspect that most of us in the 
West perceive globalization as a kind of irresistible historical tsunami: as with the earlier 
Industrial Revolution-of which in many respects it is only the latest phase-it would 
be futile to adopt a "Luddite" stance and try to "stop" it. The most we can hope to do is 
ameliorate its more unfortunate "side-effects"-In particular, the damage it causes to tra-
ditional societies, cultures, and natural environments-while, of course, maximizing its 
benefits (or should we say "profits"?). 
    In Asia the view is somewhat different. Globalization is often seen as a new phase 
of Western, especially Anglo-American, imperialism, threatening a renewal not just of 
economic exploitation but also of cultural domination-as symbolized pre-eminently by 
the globalization of the English language. Since 9/11 we have all been made acutely 
aware of the dangers of an Islamic fundamentalist cum Arab nationalist backlash against 
this perceived threat. But little thought has been given to the possibility of a national-
ist backlash coming from the other side of Asia, from a country that seems so firmly 
implanted within the global capitalist system: Japan. The very idea might seem absurd 
today, but perhaps we should not forget that Japan has a long and powerful tradition of 
both cultural and political nationalism, and that the latter has sometimes erupted into 
various kinds of extremist, anti-democratic action, including terrorism. Furthermore, at
1 This essay attempts to draw some overarching conclusions about Japanese cultural nationalism in the context 
of a globalizing Asia based largely on the research conducted by an international group of Japan and Asia schol-
ars who contributed to three books I have edited in recent years: Asian Nationalism in an Age of Globalization 
(London: Routledge/Curzon, 200 1), Nations Under Siege: Globalization and Nationalism in Asia (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002), and Japanese Cultural Nationalism at Home and in the Asia Pacific (London: Global Oriental, 
2003). 1 thank all of these learned colleagues for their freely shared knowledge, insight, and passion. 
2 For example, a recent best-selling account of globalization that presents this "standard" view of it as unstop-




certain periods in the island nation's modem history these two forces-the cultural and 
the political-have combined to produce a quite virulent resistance to the "foreign influ-
ence" of Westernization or modernization. As the famous prewar slogan proclaimed: to 
reclaim its native "soul," the Japanese nation had to "overcome modemity."' Even today, 
an arch-traditional, quasi-religious strain of cultural nationalism is prevalent, or at least 
paid lip service to, not just by the lunatic fringe but by some influential sectors of the 
Japanese political elite. In May 2000, for instance, the Prime Minister of the day, Mori 
Yoshir6 AX-A, caused a storm of protest, both domestically and internationally, with his 
declaration before a meetingof lawmakers belonging to the Shint6 Seiji Renmei (Shinto 
Political League) that: "We (have to make efforts to) make the public realize that Japan is 
a divine nation centering on the Emperor. It's been thirty years since we started our activi-
ties based on this thought."' Although some foreign observers may have been genuinely 
shocked by Mori's reactionary, "atavistic," stance, no one who knew Japan or Japanese 
politics well was particularly surprised. Indeed, members of his own party generally did 
not challenge the validity of his remark; they merely regretted its indiscretion as a public 
pronouncement. As the unintentionally revealing excuse offered by the Secretary General 
of the party explained: "the comment was probably a platitude for the religious group."' 
In other words, in the circles in which Mori and his colleagues moved, the belief that "Ja-
pan is a divine nation centering on the Emperor" was merely an accepted truism, so that 
nothing much should be read into the Prime Minister's remark-in the context in which 
it was given, it certainly did not represent any revolutionary departure from the norm. 
This despite the fact that the statement clearly infringed upon the postwar Constitution of 
Japan, which disestablished Shinto as the state religion and placed the people rather than 
the Emperor at the nation's sovereign "center." 
    The Prime Minister, as the Secretary General suggested, may have been merely 
repeating a ritualistic formula to please the ears of his elderly, conservative audience, but 
his statement, even if designed only to curry favor, still shows how closely associated 
Japanese nationalism remains, in the popular mind, with Shinto, the emperor system, 
and even emperor-worship. Although some analysts haVe presented Mori's "gaffe" as yet 
another symptom of Japan's "move to the right" in the late 20'hcentury,' Mori's own com-
ment ("It's been thirty years since we started our activities based on this thought") makes 
it clear that, throughout much of the postwar period, such religio-nationalist sentiments 
were never far from the mainstream of Japanese political life. 
    There are, of course, other examples in Asia of the close association of nationalism 
with religion-Hindu nationalism in India, for instance, or the many different national va-
rieties of Islamic nationalism-but we must also remember that, within the Asian context, 
Japan's historical experience has been somewhat unique. In the past century and a half 
it has suffered-and profited by-two periods when it was reduced to colonial or semi-
colonial status: in the latter half of the I 91h century, the period of extraterritorial treaty
3 See, for instance, Najita and Harootunian 1988, Harootunian 2000, and Hirakawa 2005. 
4 The Japan Times Online, 17 May 2000. 
5 Ibid. 
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cation of Yamaji's thought, Ito regrets, that postwar Japanese historians have "tended to 
reassess pre-war Sinology simply as part of the Japanese government's aggressive poli-
cies" and thus have neglected to give writers like Yamaji the serious consideration they 
deserve. 16 
    Jung-Sun N. Han also acknowledges the diversity of nationalist thought vis-d-vis 
overseas expansion, but finds nonetheless that: 
       [W]hether it took the form of establishing "a new, European-style empire on 
       the edge of Asia," as Foreign Minister Inoue Karou once claimed, or making a 
       pan-Asian strategic aligni-nent among Japan, Korea, and China to carve out Ja-
       pan's Asia free of Western imperial encroachment, as PrinceKonoe Atsumaro 
       advocated, there was a growing consensus that Japanneeded to expand itself 
       onto the Asian continent in order to establish a sovereign andcompetent nation-
       state. In short, the modem Japanese transformation was made of both "nation-
       building" and "empire-building" processes, which weremutually constitutive, 
       sometimes conflicting and sometimes complementing each other." 
Focussing in particular on the well-known theorist of democracy, Yoshino Sakuza 'r_3 
Vff~-iA-, a professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University, Han argues that "the need to 
rationalize the imperial project in the changing international system forced Yoshino to 
redefine Japan's own image of self in accordance with international terms."" What this 
meant in practical terms, for instance, was that he was in favour of Japan's economic 
penetration of China but not in its territorial expansion there, which he knew would 
provoke conflict with the other foreign powers on the ground. To offset Japan's economic 
and industrial weakness relative to the Western powers, according to Han, "Yoshino 
called for a cultural turn in Japan's China policy."" In other words, the Japanese would 
win the Chinese over by emphasizing their intellectual affinities-but not, surprisingly, 
their racial or cultural affinities: "what Yoshino assumed as an intellectual affinity was not 
tradition-bound but a modem invention-it referred to the export of the recent experience 
of the Meiji Restoration to China."" Thus, in his Short History of Chinese Revolution 
(1917), Yoshino described the Chinese revolutionaries as the "spiritual heirs of the Meiji 
Restoration" and "emphatically articulated the ways in which the Japanese 'spirit' of 
modernizing the political system was transmitted to the Chinese, laying the groundwork 
for the Chinese revolutions."" In this way he sought "to make the experience of the Meiji 
Restoration the central paradigm in sustaining the influence of the Japanese Empire."" 
    Ironically in view of the imperialist uses to which he would put it, Yoshino viewed 
the Meiji Restoration as a great liberal democratic event, "the universal expression of the
56 Ibid., p. 226. 
57 Han 2004, p. 23 1. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., p. 236. 
60 Ibid., p. 237. 
61 Ibid., pp. 239-240. 
62 Ibid., p. 240.
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progressive popular will against oppressive government."" But, as Han points out, by 
presenting the Meiji legacy, including the Constitution and the emperor system, through 
the medium of "liberal discourse," Yoshino hoped to make it "congenial with the domi-
nant imperial norms of international society" and thus ensure the survival of a "new Japan 
                                       1114 at the core ofa liberal mpire. 
    In the thought of writers such as Yamaji and Yoshino, then, we can see some in-
teresting-and paradoxical-early attempts to export or globalize Japanese cultural na-
tionalism by an appeal to some form of pan-Asianism. Although their brave attempts at 
a grand synthesis of these two apparently conflicting ideologies may not have won many 
converts on the Asian mainland (except among Japanese expatriates), within Japan itself 
their ideas became mainstream until 1 945, and even today they still help shape popular 
and nationalist interpretations of Japan's role in Asia-Pacific history.
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